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FRY v. YEATMAN
in the American law of implied restrictions.48 The doctrine
is one of equitable relief; it would seem only just that en-
forcement of implied restrictions should be more difficult
than that of express. The enforcement should be strictly
limited to those cases in which the implication stands out
with all the unassailable prominence of a village church
spire - to those cases where the equities of the enforcing
party are weighty and clear. The basis for the doctrine is
a public policy favoring private zoning arrangements, which
are always more secure than public zoning ordinances.
But that policy must always be expected to stand beneath
the policy favoring unrestricted use of property by its
owner,44 when the two close in a conflict of doubts. This
is the first case to reverse that order.
ROGER D. REDDEN
The Right To Contest A Will
In Maryland
Fry v. Yeatman'
This caveat of a will was filed in the Orphans' Court of
Montgomery County by the sister of the testator. The
testator was survived by his widow, father, and mother -
his heirs at law in case of intestacy.2 By his will, which was
admitted to probate on November 25, 1952, his mother and
father were left nothing. Ten months later the father and
mother both died testate, the will of the mother completely
disinheriting her daughter, the caveatrix in this case, and
the will of the father leaving her a legacy of $100.00. This
CfC. Price v. Anderson, 318 Pa. 209, 56 A. 2d 215, 219 (1948), where it was
said that:
"But the mere fact that a grantor imposes restrictions on parts of a
tract which he sells does not raise any inference that he means thereby
to obligate himself to restrict the remainder of his property; in every
such case there must appear definite evidence of a purpose to bind the
remaining land, and that purpose must be clearly made known to the
grantees."
This approach to implied restrictions is manifest In Rose v. Kenneseth
Israel Congregation, 288 Minn. 240, 36 N. W. 2d 791 (1949) and Baederwood,
Inc. v. Moyer, 370 Pa. 35, 87 A. 2d 246 (1952). As to the general stinginess
of enforcement, see cases noted In 60 A. L. R. 1216, 144 A. L. R. 916.
"In 2 AMEWICAN LAW oF PRoPEaTY (1952), Sec. 9.29, 416, it is suggested
that restrictions should be favored on the ground that they actually heighten
alienability in a residential area. This does not answer the right of a
property owner to free use of his land.
-207 Md. 379, 114 A. 2d 621 (1955).
2 Md. Code (1951), Art. 93, Secs. 132, 133, 136, Art. 46, Secs. 1, 2.
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disinherited daughter filed a notice to caveat the wills of
her parents, and consequently they were not as yet pro-
bated when she filed the caveat in question in the instant
case. The caveatrix filed the caveat on November 24, 1953,
one day within the statutory limitation on the time for con-
testing wills in Maryland. The Orphans' Court dismissed
the caveat because of the insufficiency of the caveatrix's
interest in the estate of the testator to maintain a contest
of his will. On appeal to the Circuit Court for Montgomery
County this decision was affirmed.
The Court of Appeals, in affirming the lower court's
decision Held: - since the caveatrix had not yet filed
caveats to the wills of her mother and father to establish
her interest in the testator's estate, her possibility of being
successful in annulling either of their wills was not such an
interest that would allow her to caveat the testator's will.
The Court expressly refused to hazard a guess as to the re-
sult if the caveatrix had also filed caveats to the wills of her
father and mother before or at the same time as filing the
one to her brother's will. It also left unanswered a query as
to the outcome had the caveatrix asked the Orphans' Court
to toll the limitations on the time in which she could con-
test the testator's will until the issues under the caveats to
the wills of her parents had been decided.
The question of who may contest a will has been the
subject of an enormous amount of litigation throughout the
United States. Under the typical statute limiting the right
of contest to "any person interested", or under general prin-
ciples established in the absence of statute, the courts have
generally required that the contestant have some pecuniary
interest in the estate of the testator in the event that the
testamentary paper under attack is set aside.4 Thus, the
courts agree on the proposition that a mere stranger to the
estate of the testator can not contest, and that a disinherited
heir or legatee under a prior will may contest.5 However,
as to the situations which lie between these two extremes
there are many conflicting decisions. The problem in the in-
stant case is more readily analyzed if the question as to
possible contestants is divided into two phases.
3 Code (1951), Art. 93, Sec. 372:
"No will, testament, codicil or other testamentary paper shall be sub-
ject to caveat or other objection to Its validity after the expiration of
one year from its probate."
'68 C. J. 902, Wills, Sec. 631. 2 PAGE, WELLS (Lifetime ed.), Sec. 610,




IN WHOM DOES THE RIGHT TO CONTE T ACCRUE
AT THE TIME THE WILL IS OFFERED
IN PROBATE?
When a will is offered for probate, the courts uniformly
recognize a right of contest in all disinherited heirs. Simi-
larly a legatee who receives more under a prior will is
allowed to contest.' A conflict of authority exists as to the
right of an executor' under a prior will, or of a person
entitled to administer' the estate in case of intestacy, while
a trustee has been treated as a legatee and allowed to con-
test.' The authorities also differ on whether parties who
have a contingent interest in the estate have the right to
contest.'" However, it seems well settled that the right does
not accrue to a party, who otherwise would have no interest,
merely because of his relationship to a living person who is
possessed of such a right.1 His possibility of acquiring an
interest in the future through this living person is deemed
insufficient.
In the absence of a statute in Maryland specifying the
parties entitled to contest, the Court of Appeals has limited
the right to a "party interested". In Johnston v. Willis,12
the Court announced the general rule to be:
"... any person having an interest in the property of
the testator in the event the will is annulled has the
right to caveat his will."
This broad language has been cited in many Maryland de-
cisions which have mitigated its effect. The Court of Ap-
peals has allowed a legatee under a will revoked by a later
one to contest.18 The right to contest has been extended
ICrowell v. Davis, 233 Mass. 136, 123 N. E. 611 (1919), Appeal of Buck-
ingham, 57 Conn. 544, 18 A. 256 (1889). It would seem that courts should
refuse to allow a party to contest who has a greater financial interest if
the will is upheld. Connor v. Brown, 9 Harv. 529 (Del.) 3 A. 2d 64 (1938) ;
In re Fallon's Will, 107 Iowa 120, 77 N. W. 575 (1898). Cf. Dexter v. Cod-
man, 148 Mass. 421, 19 N. E. 517 (1889).
'Allowing: In Re Murphy's Estate, 153 Minn. 60, 189 N. W. 413 (1922)
Connelly v. Sullivan, 50 Ill. app. 627 (1893). Disallowing: In re Stewart's
Estate, 107 Iowa 117, 77 N. W. 574 (1898).
8 Allowing: In Re Carll's Will, 201 Misc. Rep. 829, 106 N. Y. S. 2d 363
(1951) ; Webb v. Lohnes, 96 F. 2d 582 (C. A. D. C., 1938). Disallowing:
Austin v. Patrick, 179 Miss. 718, 176 So. 714 (1937) ; In re Sexton's Estate,
146 Neb. 618, 20 N. W. 2d 871 (1945). For discussion see 58 A. L. R. 1462.9 Reed v. Home Nat. Bank, 297 Mass. 222, 8 N. E. 2d 601 (1937).
10 Allowing: In re Plant's Estate, 27 Cal. 2d 424, 164 P. 2d 765 (1945)
Disallowing where contestant only had a mere possibility: In re Rogers'
Estate, 15 N. J. S. 189, 83 A. 2d 268 (1951). See also: 162 A. L. R. 843.
uHalde v. Schultz, 17 S. D. 465, 97 N. W. 369 (1903) ; In re Ballmann's
Will, 198 Misc. Rep. 916, 100 N. Y. S. 2d 447 (1950) ; 149 A. L. R. 1270.
2147 Md. 237, 240, 127 A. 862 (1925).
IsDe Garmendia's Estate, 146 Md. 47, 125 A. 897 (1924) ; Hamill v. Hamill,
162 Md. 159, 159 A. 247 (1932).
19561
MARYLAND LAW REVIEW
to a trustee under a prior will. 4 However an executor
whose appointment under the will was revoked by a codicil
was refused the right to caveat." In Loyola College v.
Stuart,'6 where religious corporations who were named
beneficiaries in a prior will filed a caveat to a later will,
although under the Maryland Declaration of Rights in order
to be valid, all gifts to religious corporations had to be sub-
sequently sanctioned by the Legislature, it was held that
since their gift could be ratified by timely legislative action,
the caveators were sufficiently interested. This decision,
apparently recognizing the right to contest in a contingent
legatee under a prior will, must be compared with Blake v.
Blake, 7 where the Court of Appeals refused to allow a
caveat to a codicil by a contingent remainderman under
the will, whose taking was predicated on the happening of
two events. In so holding the Court of Appeals said:
".. . the possible future interest of the appellants in
the testator's estate is too remote to serve as the basis
of a right to contest the codicil by which his will was
modified. In order to be sufficient for such a purpose,
the contingent interest should at least be one which
would have fastened upon the remainder if the con-
tingency affecting its vesting, at the death of the life
tenant, had occurred when the caveat was filed.""'
These cases may be harmonized in view of the differences
in the contingencies involved, but at what degree of con-
tingency the Court will draw the line as to the accrual of
the right to contest is uncertain. It is reasonable to infer,
however, that the Court of Appeals would not recognize
a right to caveat by a party who, but for his relationship
to a living person with a right to contest, would have no in-
terest in the testator's estate.
Thus, under the prevailing Maryland view, as well as
general trend of decisions throughout the United States,
no right to contest had accrued to the caveatrix in the in-
stant case at the time the will was offered for probate. At
this time the caveatrix was merely a presumptive heir of
a party who held the right. Whether the caveatrix gained
the necessary standing to contest after the death of her
parents raises the second phase of the problem.
14 Johnston v. Willis, 8upra, n. 12; Morgan v. Dietrich, 178 Md. 66, 12 A.
2d 199 (1940).
Helfrich v. Yockel, 143 Md. 371, 122 A. 360 (1923).
179 Md. 96, 16 A. 2d 895 (1940).




CAN THE RIGHT TO CONTEST SuBsEQUENTLY BECOME
MAINTAINABLE BY THOSE CLAIMING THROUGH
THE PARTY TO WHOM IT ORIGINALLY
ACCRUED?
The cases in which this problem most frequently arises
are those where the party to whom the right of contest
accrued dies within the statutory period for contesting the
will of the testator, and his heirs, personal representatives,
or beneficiaries under his will attempt to contest the origi-
nal will. The caveators there proceed on the theory that
if the contested will is annulled, they will have an interest
in the estate of the testator through the party who died
with the right of contest. 19 The courts that allow the con-
test to be originated by an heir, personal representative, or
beneficiary under the will of a deceased party to whom the
right of contest originally accrued, treat the right of con-
test as a property right which survives the death of the
original accruee2 0 Generally the same courts that allow an
heir, personal representative, or beneficiary under a will to
originate the contest, allow him to revive a contest insti-
tuted by the party through whom he claims. 1 The rationale
advanced by these courts was probably best stated by the
Supreme Court of Washington when they said:
".. . the heir of an heir has, on descent cast, exactly
the same direct pecuniary interest that the deceased
heir had. In either case, but for the will, the same prop-
erty rights would have descended first to the heir, then
to the heirs of the heir .... It is a property right in no
sense purely personal to the heir of the testator,...,,12
Conversely, the courts that deny the right of the heirs, per-
sonal representatives, and beneficiaries under the will of
the party to whom the right of contest originally accrued
19Conversely, if the accruee was merely a trustee or executor under a
prior will, the right of contest based on this purely personal status should
only be maintainable by the party to whom it accrued.
10 In Re Baker's Estate, 170 Cal. 578, 150 P. 989 (1915) ; In Re Rapp's
Will, 180 Misc. Rep. 731, 44 N. Y. S. 2d 404 (1943) ; In Re Field's Estate,
38 Cal. 2d 151, 238 P. 2d 578 (1952) ; In Re Siebs' Estate, 70 Wash. 374,
126 P. 912 (1912) ; Crawfordsville Trust Co. v. Ramsey, 178 Ind. 258, 98
N. E. 177 (1912) ; Chilcote v. Hoffman, 97 Ohio St. 98, 119 N. E. 364 (1918) ;
129 A. L. R. 324. See Dickson v. Dickson, 5 S. W. 2d 744 (Tex., 1928),
where the court denied a disinherited heir of the original accruee the right
to contest. This case seems to be in point with the instant case.
n Hall v. Blackard, 298 Kent. 354, 182 S. W. 2d 904 (1944) ; In Re Macken-
zie's Will, 247 App. Div. 317, 286 N. Y. S. 362 (1936) ; In Re Hilkemeier's
Will, 46 N. Y. S. 2d 161 (1943) ; Holt v. Rice, 51 N. H. 370 (1871) ; Burnett
v. Milnes, 148 Ind. 230, 46 N. E. 464 (1897).
Ingersoll v. Gourley, 72 Wash. 462, 130 P. 743, 747 (1913).
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to originate or revive a contest, treat the right of contest
as a personal right in the original accruee.28 An example
of the reasoning of these courts may be seen in the language
of an opinion by the Supreme Court of Tennessee:
"The (right of contest) ... was not a property right.
It was a mere right of action, in which nothing could or
can be directly recovered .... The policy of the law is
against the transfer of mere rights of action." 2
4
Some of the courts that have recognized the right of
contest as a property right have allowed a creditor of a
disinherited heir to bring a contest of the will.25 This can
be justified by considering the right of contest as a means
of garnishing an asset of the debtor.
There is only one prior Maryland decision covering this
phase of the problem. In Brewer v. Barrett,26 where the
testator left A, B, and C as his heirs at law and A subse-
quently died, it was held that A's heirs were sufficiently
interested in the estate of the testator to originate a contest
of his will. A statute in Maryland gives heirs, personal
representatives, and beneficiaries under a will of the de-
ceased party with the right to contest the right to continue
a contest instituted by the original accruee.27 However, the
availability of these remedies in Maryland is lessened to
some extent by the statutory limitation on the time for
bringing the contest, which provides that no contest may
be instituted after one year from the admission of the will
to probate.28 Furthermore, unlike some similar statutes in
other jurisdictions no period of extension for disabilities is
2Selden v. Illinois Trust & Savings Bank, 239 Ill. 67, 87 N. E. 860 (1909) ;
Darby v. Arrington, 194 Miss. 123, 11 So. 2d 220 (1942) ; Storrs v. St. Luke's
Hospital, 180 Ill. 368, 54 N. E. 185 (1899) ; Cain v. Burger, 219 Ala. 10, 121
So. 17 (1929) ; Hall v. Proctor, 242 Ala. 636, 7 So. 2d 764 (1942) ; Davis v.
Davis, 252 S. W. 2d 521 (Mo., 1952); Thomson v. Butler, 136 F. 2d 644
(8th Cir., 1943).
21 Ligon v. Hawkes, 110 Tenn. 514, 75 S. W. 1072, 1074 (1903). Paren-
thetical material supplied.
21 Allowing: In Re Kalt's Estate, 16 Cal. 2d 807, 108 P. 2d 401 (1940) ; In
Re Van Doren's Estate, 119 N. J. Eq. 80, 180 A. 841 (1935). Disallowing:
Lockard v. Stephenson, 120 Ala. 641, 24 So. 996 (1899) ; Shepard's Estate,
170 Pa. 323, 32 A. 1040 (1895). See 46 A. L. R. 1490; 128 A. L. R. 963.
58 Md. 587 (1882).
21 Md. Code (1951), Art. 93, Sec. 234:
"Wherever after issues granted any party -thereto dies, the court to
which they are sent may admit as a party to such issues the proper
representative, whether as to realty or personalty, namely, devisee, heir,
executor or administrator of the party so dying in the place of such
party, and the Orphans' Courts shall have the same right at any time
after filing a petition before the issues are sent."
,Md. Code (1951), Art. 93, Sec. 372, set out in full, 8upra, n. 3.
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allowed.29 While the above decision in Brewer v. Barrett
would seem to indicate a treatment of the right to contest
as a property right, the Court of Appeals has refused to
allow a judgment creditor of a disinherited heir to maintain
a caveat to the will which disinherited his debtor. In Lee v.
Keech,30 the Court reasoned:
"The judgment creditor would not be one upon
whom any part of the estate or rights of ownership in
the property would devolve if intestacy should be
established, ..."
It is interesting to note that in that case the testator's
property was real estate on which the lien of the judgment
creditor would attach immediately if intestacy were estab-
lished. This apparently inconsistent view was explained
by the Court. They pointed out that if intestacy were estab-
lished, the judgment creditor would not have "a part of the
sum total rights of ownership" 31 but merely a lien. This dis-
tinction seems valid.
In the instant case the caveatrix was disinherited by the
original accruees, her parents, and therefore even if the
Court of Appeals had considered the right of contest as a
property right, it would not have passed to her on their
death. It is submitted that the caveatrix would have been in
no better position had she filed caveats to the wills of her
parents at the same time as filing the one involved here,
since she would still have had merely a possibility of an
interest in the estate of her parents until the issues on the
caveats were heard. Whether the Orphans' Court could
have honored a request of a party in the position of the
caveatrix here to toll the limitations on his right to contest
until he could establish a right to the estate of the original
accruee is doubtful under the prior decisions of the Court
of Appeals in dealing with the statute.2
Although the Court of Appeals has never expressly
adopted the view that the right of contest is a property
right, their prior decisions indicate a treatment of it as
such, if only in a limited sense. Before recognizing the
right of contest as an absolute property right the Court of
Appeals would have to weigh the reasonable arguments pro
2 The Court of Appeals has refused to read a period of extension for dis-
abilities into the statute. See: McLaughlin v. McLaughlin, 186 Md. 165, 46
A. 2d 307 (1946) ; Garrison v. Hill, 81 Md. 551, 32 A. 191 (1895). Also see:
15 A. L. R. 2d 515, as to the possibility of fraud affecting the limitation in
time for bringing a contest.





and con. Such a recognition would allow more persons to
tie up the estate of a testator with contests of his will, and
the resulting depletion of the estate with the costs incident
to the defense of these suits is a worthy argument against
the propriety of the acceptance of this absolute view. In
rebuttal, the statutory limitation on the time for filing a
caveat might be sufficient to prevent overburdening litiga-
tion; and moreover, protection of parties who may have a
right to property is a strong argument for the adoption of
the absolute view. In view of the history of the treatment
of this problem by the Court of Appeals, it is more probable
that this Court would decline the adoption of any absolute
view, but rather would prefer to have each different situa-
tion separately considered, at which time its inclusion or
exclusion from the class of qualified contestants would of
necessity be made.
ROBERT LEE KARWACKI
Punitive Damages In Equity
Superior Construction Co. v. Elmo'
Appellant, as a result of his building operations, caused
debris and silt to be deposited on appellee's land. In the
trial court, in equity, appellee secured an injunction against
further trespass and an award of full compensatory dam-
ages, as well as $1,000.00 as punitive damages. This decree
was affirmed by the Court of Appeals, except as to the allow-
ance of punitive damages, on which question reargument
was ordered.
On reargument, the Court held that where a party seek-
ing equitable relief also seeks punitive damages as inci-
dental thereto, the court of equity, as a condition to its
giving assistance, will require the party to waive any claim
to punitive damages because they are in the nature of a
penalty or forfeiture. The Court further held that in award-
ing damages to provide complete relief and avoid multi-
plicity of suits, it was applying a permissive and not a man-
datory jurisdiction, and that since the rule was one of con-
venience, it would be applied only in those cases where it
was consistent with the fundamental principles of equity,
one of which principles is that equity will permit only what
is just and right, with no element of vengeance.2
'204 Md. 1, 102 A. 2d 739, 104 A. 2d 581 (1954).
'The Court stated that punitive damages could have been justifiably
awarded in the present case if It had been tried at law. Ibid, 14.
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